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Abstract
Much of human dialogue occurs in semi-
cooperative settings, where agents with
different goals attempt to agree on com-
mon decisions. Negotiations require com-
plex communication and reasoning skills,
but success is easy to measure, making
this an interesting task for AI. We gather
a large dataset of human-human negoti-
ations on a multi-issue bargaining task,
where agents who cannot observe each
other’s reward functions must reach an
agreement (or a deal) via natural language
dialogue. For the first time, we show it is
possible to train end-to-end models for ne-
gotiation, which must learn both linguistic
and reasoning skills with no annotated di-
alogue states. We also introduce dialogue
rollouts, in which the model plans ahead
by simulating possible complete continu-
ations of the conversation, and find that
this technique dramatically improves per-
formance. Our code and dataset are pub-
licly available.1
1 Introduction
Intelligent agents often need to cooperate with oth-
ers who have different goals, and typically use
natural language to agree on decisions. Negotia-
tion is simultaneously a linguistic and a reasoning
problem, in which an intent must be formulated
and then verbally realised. Such dialogues contain
both cooperative and adversarial elements, and re-
quire agents to understand, plan, and generate ut-
terances to achieve their goals (Traum et al., 2008;
Asher et al., 2012).
We collect the first large dataset of natural lan-
guage negotiations between two people, and show
1
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that end-to-end neural models can be trained to
negotiate by maximizing the likelihood of human
actions. This approach is scalable and domain-
independent, but does not model the strategic
skills required for negotiating well. We fur-
ther show that models can be improved by train-
ing and decoding to maximize reward instead of
likelihood—by training with self-play reinforce-
ment learning, and using rollouts to estimate the
expected reward of utterances during decoding.
To study semi-cooperative dialogue, we gather
a dataset of 5808 dialogues between humans on a
negotiation task. Users were shown a set of items
with a value for each, and asked to agree how to
divide the items with another user who has a dif-
ferent, unseen, value function (Figure 1).
We first train recurrent neural networks to imi-
tate human actions. We find that models trained to
maximise the likelihood of human utterances can
generate fluent language, but make comparatively
poor negotiators, which are overly willing to com-
promise. We therefore explore two methods for
improving the model’s strategic reasoning skills—
both of which attempt to optimise for the agent’s
goals, rather than simply imitating humans:
Firstly, instead of training to optimise likeli-
hood, we show that our agents can be consider-
ably improved using self play, in which pre-trained
models practice negotiating with each other in or-
der to optimise performance. To avoid the models
diverging from human language, we interleave re-
inforcement learning updates with supervised up-
dates. For the first time, we show that end-to-
end dialogue agents trained using reinforcement
learning outperform their supervised counterparts
in negotiations with humans.
Secondly, we introduce a new form of planning
for dialogue called dialogue rollouts, in which an
agent simulates complete dialogues during decod-
ing to estimate the eward of utterances. We show
Figure 1: A dialogue in our Mechanical Turk interface, which we used to collect a negotiation dataset.
that decoding to maximise the reward function
(rather than likelihood) significantly improves per-
formance against both humans and machines.
Analysing the performance of our agents, we
find evidence of sophisticated negotiation strate-
gies. For example, we find instances of the model
feigning interest in a valueless issue, so that it can
later ‘compromise’ by conceding it. Deceit is a
complex skill that requires hypothesising the other
agent’s beliefs, and is learnt relatively late in child
development (Talwar and Lee, 2002). Our agents
have learnt to deceive without any explicit human
design, simply by trying to achieve their goals.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: §2 de-
scribes the collection of a large dataset of human-
human negotiation dialogues. §3 describes a base-
line supervised model, which we then show can
be improved by goal-based training (§4) and de-
coding (§5). §6 measures the performance of our
models and humans on this task, and §7 gives a
detailed analysis and suggests future directions.
2 Data Collection
2.1 Overview
To enable end-to-end training of negotiation
agents, we first develop a novel negotiation task
and curate a dataset of human-human dialogues
for this task. This task and dataset follow our
proposed general framework for studying semi-
cooperative dialogue. Initially, each agent is
shown an input specifying a space of possible ac-
tions and a reward function which will score the
outcome of the negotiation. Agents then sequen-
tially take turns of either sending natural language
messages, or selecting that a final decision has
been reached. When one agent selects that an
agreement has been made, both agents indepen-
dently output what they think the agreed decision
was. If conflicting decisions are made, both agents
are given zero reward.
2.2 Task
Our task is an instance of multi issue bargaining
(Fershtman, 1990), and is based on DeVault et al.
(2015). Two agents are both shown the same col-
lection of items, and instructed to divide them so
that each item assigned to one agent.
Each agent is given a different randomly gen-
erated value function, which gives a non-negative
value for each item. The value functions are con-
strained so that: (1) the total value for a user of
all items is 10; (2) each item has non-zero value
to at least one user; and (3) some items have non-
zero value to both users. These constraints enforce
that it is not possible for both agents to receive a
maximum score, and that no item is worthless to
both agents, so the negotiation will be competitive.
After 10 turns, we allow agents the option to com-
plete the negotiation with no agreement, which is
worth 0 points to both users. We use 3 item types
(books, hats, balls), and between 5 and 7 total
items in the pool. Figure 1 shows our interface.
2.3 Data Collection
We collected a set of human-human dialogues us-
ing Amazon Mechanical Turk. Workers were paid
$0.15 per dialogue, with a $0.05 bonus for max-
imal scores. We only used workers based in the
United States with a 95% approval rating and at
least 5000 previous HITs. Our data collection in-
terface was adapted from that of Das et al. (2016).
We collected a total of 5808 dialogues, based
on 2236 unique scenarios (where a scenario is the
Crowd Sourced Dialogue
Agent 1 Input
3xbook value=1
2xhat value=3
1xball value=1
Agent 2 Input
3xbook value=2
2xhat value=1
1xball value=2
Dialogue
Agent 1: I want the books and the hats,
you get the ball
Agent 2: Give me a book too and we
have a deal
Agent 1: Ok, deal
Agent 2: <choose>
Agent 1 Output
2xbook 2xhat
Agent 2 Output
1xbook 1xball
Perspective: Agent 1
Perspective: Agent 2
Input
3xbook value=1
2xhat value=3
1xball value=1
Output
2xbook 2xhat
Dialogue
write: I want the books
and the hats, you get
the ball read: Give me
a book too and we have
a deal write: Ok, deal
read: <choose>
Input
3xbook value=2
2xhat value=1
1xball value=2
Dialogue
read: I want the books
and the hats, you get
the ball write: Give me
a book too and we have
a deal read: Ok, deal
write: <choose>
Output
1xbook 1xball
Figure 2: Converting a crowd-sourced dialogue (left) into two training examples (right), from the per-
spective of each user. The perspectives differ on their input goals, output choice, and in special tokens
marking whether a statement was read or written. We train conditional language models to predict the
dialogue given the input, and additional models to predict the output given the dialogue.
available items and values for the two users). We
held out a test set of 252 scenarios (526 dialogues).
Holding out test scenarios means that models must
generalise to new situations.
3 Likelihood Model
We propose a simple but effective baseline model
for the conversational agent, in which a sequence-
to-sequence model is trained to produce the com-
plete dialogue, conditioned on an agent’s input.
3.1 Data Representation
Each dialogue is converted into two training ex-
amples, showing the complete conversation from
the perspective of each agent. The examples differ
on their input goals, output choice, and whether
utterances were read or written.
Training examples contain an input goal g,
specifying the available items and their values, a
dialogue x, and an output decision o specifying
which items each agent will receive. Specifically,
we represent g as a list of six integers correspond-
ing to the count and value of each of the three item
types. Dialogue x is a list of tokens x0..T contain-
ing the turns of each agent interleaved with sym-
bols marking whether a turn was written by the
agent or their partner, terminating in a special to-
ken indicating one agent has marked that an agree-
ment has been made. Output o is six integers de-
scribing how many of each of the three item types
are assigned to each agent. See Figure 2.
3.2 Supervised Learning
We train a sequence-to-sequence network to gen-
erate an agent’s perspective of the dialogue condi-
tioned on the agent’s input goals (Figure 3a).
The model uses 4 recurrent neural networks,
implemented as GRUs (Cho et al., 2014): GRUw,
GRUg, GRU−→o , and GRU←−o .
The agent’s input goals g are encoded using
GRUg. We refer to the final hidden state as h
g .
The model then predicts each token xt from left to
right, conditioned on the previous tokens and hg .
At each time step t, GRUw takes as input the pre-
vious hidden state ht−1, previous token xt−1 (em-
bedded with a matrix E), and input encoding hg .
Conditioning on the input at each time step helps
the model learn dependencies between language
and goals.
ht = GRUw(ht−1, [Ext−1, h
g]) (1)
The token at each time step is predicted with a
softmax, which uses weight tying with the embed-
ding matrix E (Mao et al., 2015):
pθ(xt|x0..t−1, g) ∝ exp(E
Tht) (2)
Input Encoder Output Decoder
write: Take one hat read: I need two write: deal . . .
(a) Supervised Training
Input Encoder Output Decoder
write: Take one hat read: I need two write: deal . . .
(b) Decoding, and Reinforcement Learning
Figure 3: Our model: tokens are predicted conditioned on previous words and the input, then the output
is predicted using attention over the complete dialogue. In supervised training (3a), we train the model
to predict the tokens of both agents. During decoding and reinforcement learning (3b) some tokens are
sampled from the model, but some are generated by the other agent and are only encoded by the model.
Note that the model predicts both agent’s words,
enabling its use as a forward model in Section 5.
At the end of the dialogue, the agent outputs
a set of tokens o representing the decision. We
generate each output conditionally independently,
using a separate classifier for each. The classi-
fiers share bidirectional GRUo and attention mech-
anism (Bahdanau et al., 2014) over the dialogue,
and additionally conditions on the input goals.
h
−→o
t = GRU−→o (h
−→o
t−1, [Ext, ht]) (3)
h
←−o
t = GRU←−o (h
←−o
t+1, [Ext, ht]) (4)
hot = [h
←−o
t , h
−→o
t ] (5)
hat = W [tanh(W
′hot )] (6)
αt =
exp(w · hat )∑
t′ exp(w · h
a
t′)
(7)
hs = tanh(W s[hg,
∑
t
αtht]) (8)
The output tokens are predicted using softmax:
pθ(oi|x0..t, g) ∝ exp(W
oihs) (9)
The model is trained to minimize the negative
log likelihood of the token sequence x0..T con-
ditioned on the input goals g, and of the outputs
o conditioned on x and g. The two terms are
weighted with a hyperparameter α.
L(θ) =−
∑
x,g
∑
t
log pθ(xt|x0..t−1, g)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Token prediction loss
− α
∑
x,g,o
∑
j
log pθ(oj |x0..T , g)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Output choice prediction loss
(10)
Unlike the Neural Conversational Model
(Vinyals and Le, 2015), our approach shares all
parameters for reading and generating tokens.
3.3 Decoding
During decoding, the model must generate an
output token xt conditioned on dialogue history
x0..t−1 and input goals g, by sampling from pθ:
xt ∼ pθ(xt|x0..t−1, g) (11)
If the model generates a special end-of-turn to-
ken, it then encodes a series of tokens output by
the other agent, until its next turn (Figure 3b).
The dialogue ends when either agent outputs a
special end-of-dialogue token. The model then
outputs a set of choices o. We choose each item
independently, but enforce consistency by check-
ing the solution is in a feasible set O:
o∗ = argmax
o∈O
∏
i
pθ(oi|x0..T , g) (12)
In our task, a solution is feasible if each item is as-
signed to exactly one agent. The space of solutions
is small enough to be tractably enumerated.
4 Goal-based Training
Supervised learning aims to imitate the actions of
human users, but does not explicitly attempt to
maximise an agent’s goals. Instead, we explore
pre-training with supervised learning, and then
fine-tuning against the evaluation metric using re-
inforcement learning. Similar two-stage learning
strategies have been used previously (e.g. Li et al.
(2016); Das et al. (2017)).
During reinforcement learning, an agent A at-
tempts to improve its parameters from conversa-
tions with another agent B. While the other agent
B could be a human, in our experiments we used
our fixed supervised model that was trained to im-
itate humans. The second model is fixed as we
found that updating the parameters of both agents
led to divergence from human language. In effect,
read: You get
one book and
I’ll take every-
thing else.
write: Great deal,
thanks!
write: No way, I
need all 3 hats read: Ok, fine
read: I’ll give you 2
read: No problem
read: Any time
choose: 3x hat
choose: 2x hat
choose: 1x book
choose: 1x book
9
6
1
1
Dialogue history Candidate responses Simulation of rest of dialogue Score
Figure 4: Decoding through rollouts: The model first generates a small set of candidate responses. For
each candidate it simulates the future conversation by sampling, and estimates the expected future reward
by averaging the scores. The system outputs the candidate with the highest expected reward.
agent A learns to improve by simulating conversa-
tions with the help of a surrogate forward model.
Agent A reads its goals g and then generates
tokens x0..n by sampling from pθ. When x gener-
ates an end-of-turn marker, it then reads in tokens
xn+1..m generated by agent B. These turns alter-
nate until one agent emits a token ending the di-
alogue. Both agents then output a decision o and
collect a reward from the environment (which will
be 0 if they output different decisions). We denote
the subset of tokens generated by A as XA (e.g.
tokens with incoming arrows in Figure 3b).
After a complete dialogue has been generated,
we update agent A’s parameters based on the out-
come of the negotiation. Let rA be the score agent
A achieved in the completed dialogue, T be the
length of the dialogue, γ be a discount factor that
rewards actions at the end of the dialogue more
strongly, and µ be a running average of completed
dialogue rewards so far2. We define the future re-
ward R for an action xt ∈ X
A as follows:
R(xt) =
∑
xt∈XA
γT−t(rA(o)− µ) (13)
We then optimise the expected reward of each
action xt ∈ X
A:
LRLθ = Ext∼pθ(xt|x0..t−1,g)[R(xt)] (14)
The gradient of LRLθ is calculated as in REIN-
FORCE (Williams, 1992):
∇θL
RL
θ =
∑
xt∈XA
Ext[R(xt)∇θ log(pθ(xt|x0..t−1, g))]
(15)
2As all rewards are non-negative, we instead re-scale them
by subtracting the mean reward found during self play. Shift-
ing in this way can reduce the variance of our estimator.
Algorithm 1 Dialogue Rollouts algorithm.
1: procedure ROLLOUT(x0..i, g)
2: u∗ ← ∅
3: for c ∈ {1..C} do ⊲ C candidate moves
4: j ← i
5: do ⊲ Rollout to end of turn
6: j ← j + 1
7: xj ∼ pθ(xj |x0..j−1, g)
8: while xk /∈ {read:, choose:}
9: u← xi+1..xj ⊲ u is candidate move
10: for s ∈ {1..S} do ⊲ S samples per move
11: k ← j ⊲ Start rollout from end of u
12: while xk 6= choose: do
⊲ Rollout to end of dialogue
13: k ← k + 1
14: xk ∼ pθ(xk|x0..k−1, g)
⊲ Calculate rollout output and reward
15: o← argmaxo′∈O p(o
′|x0..k, g)
16: R(u) ← R(u) + r(o)p(o′|x0..k, g)
17: if R(u) > R(u∗) then
18: u∗ ← u
19: return u∗ ⊲ Return best move
5 Goal-based Decoding
Likelihood-based decoding (§3.3) may not be op-
timal. For instance, an agent may be choosing be-
tween accepting an offer, or making a counter of-
fer. The former will often have a higher likelihood
under our model, as there are fewer ways to agree
than to make another offer, but the latter may lead
to a better outcome. Goal-based decoding also al-
lows more complex dialogue strategies. For exam-
ple, a deceptive utterance is likely to have a low
model score (as users were generally honest in the
supervised data), but may achieve high reward.
We instead explore decoding by maximising ex-
pected reward. We achieve this by using pθ as a
forward model for the complete dialogue, and then
deterministically computing the reward. Rewards
for an utterance are averaged over samples to cal-
culate expected future reward (Figure 4).
We use a two stage process: First, we gener-
ate c candidate utterances U = u0..c, represent-
ing possible complete turns that the agent could
make, which are generated by sampling from pθ
until the end-of-turn token is reached. Let x0..n−1
be current dialogue history. We then calculate
the expected reward R(u) of candidate utterance
u = xn,n+k by repeatedly sampling xn+k+1,T
from pθ, then choosing the best output o using
Equation 12, and finally deterministically comput-
ing the reward r(o). The reward is scaled by the
probability of the output given the dialogue, be-
cause if the agents select different outputs then
they both receive 0 reward.
R(xn..n+k) = Ex(n+k+1..T ;o)∼pθ [r(o)pθ(o|x0..T )]
(16)
We then return the utterance maximizing R.
u∗ = argmax
u∈U
R(u) (17)
We use 5 rollouts for each of 10 candidate turns.
6 Experiments
6.1 Training Details
We implement our models using PyTorch. All
hyper-parameters were chosen on a development
dataset. The input tokens are embedded into a
64-dimensional space, while the dialogue tokens
are embedded with 256-dimensional embeddings
(with no pre-training). The input GRUg has a
hidden layer of size 64 and the dialogue GRUw
is of size 128. The output GRU−→o and GRU←−o
both have a hidden state of size 256, the size of
hs is 256 as well. During supervised training, we
optimise using stochastic gradient descent with a
minibatch size of 16, an initial learning rate of
1.0, Nesterov momentum with µ=0.1 (Nesterov,
1983), and clipping gradients whose L2 norm ex-
ceeds 0.5. We train the model for 30 epochs and
pick the snapshot of the model with the best val-
idation perplexity. We then annealed the learn-
ing rate by a factor of 5 each epoch. We weight
the terms in the loss function (Equation 10) using
α=0.5. We do not train against output decisions
where humans selected different agreements. To-
kens occurring fewer than 20 times are replaced
with an ‘unknown’ token.
During reinforcement learning, we use a learn-
ing rate of 0.1, clip gradients above 1.0, and use
a discount factor of γ=0.95. After every 4 rein-
forcement learning updates, we make a supervised
update with mini-batch size 16 and learning rate
0.5, and we clip gradients at 1.0. We used 4086
simulated conversations.
When sampling words from pθ, we reduce the
variance by doubling the values of logits (i.e. us-
ing temperature of 0.5).
6.2 Comparison Systems
We compare the performance of the following:
LIKELIHOOD uses supervised training and decod-
ing (§3), RL is fine-tuned with goal-based self-
play (§4), ROLLOUTS uses supervised training
combined with goal-based decoding using rollouts
(§5), and RL+ROLLOUTS uses rollouts with a base
model trained with reinforcement learning.
6.3 Intrinsic Evaluation
For development, we use measured the perplexity
of user generated utterances, conditioned on the
input and previous dialogue.
Results are shown in Table 3, and show that
the simple LIKELIHOOD model produces the most
human-like responses, and the alternative training
and decoding strategies cause a divergence from
human language. Note however, that this diver-
gence may not necessarily correspond to lower
quality language—it may also indicate different
strategic decisions about what to say. Results in
§6.4 show all models could converse with humans.
6.4 End-to-End Evaluation
We measure end-to-end performance in dialogues
both with the likelihood-based agent and with hu-
mans on Mechanical Turk, on held out scenarios.
Humans were told that they were interacting
with other humans, as they had been during the
collection of our dataset (and few appeared to re-
alize they were in conversation with machines).
We measure the following statistics:
Score: The average score for each agent (which
could be a human or model), out of 10.
Agreement: The percentage of dialogues where
both agents agreed on the same decision.
Pareto Optimality: The percentage of Pareto
optimal solutions for agreed deals (a solution is
Pareto optimal if neither agent’s score can be im-
proved without lowering the other’s score). Lower
scores indicate inefficient negotiations.
vs. LIKELIHOOD vs. Human
Model
Score
(all)
Score
(agreed)
%
Agreed
% Pareto
Optimal
Score
(all)
Score
(agreed)
%
Agreed
% Pareto
Optimal
LIKELIHOOD 5.4 vs. 5.5 6.2 vs. 6.2 87.9 49.6 4.7 vs. 5.8 6.2 vs. 7.6 76.5 66.2
RL 7.1 vs. 4.2 7.9 vs. 4.7 89.9 58.6 4.3 vs. 5.0 6.4 vs. 7.5 67.3 69.1
ROLLOUTS 7.3 vs. 5.1 7.9 vs. 5.5 92.9 63.7 5.2 vs. 5.4 7.1 vs. 7.4 72.1 78.3
RL+ROLLOUTS 8.3 vs. 4.2 8.8 vs. 4.5 94.4 74.8 4.6 vs. 4.2 8.0 vs. 7.1 57.2 82.4
Table 1: End task evaluation on heldout scenarios, against the LIKELIHOOD model and humans from
Mechanical Turk. The maximum score is 10. Score (all) gives 0 points when agents failed to agree.
Metric Dataset
Number of Dialogues 5808
Average Turns per Dialogue 6.6
Average Words per Turn 7.6
% Agreed 80.1
Average Score (/10) 6.0
% Pareto Optimal 76.9
Table 2: Statistics on our dataset of crowd-
sourced dialogues between humans.
Model Valid PPL Test PPL Test Avg. Rank
LIKELIHOOD 5.62 5.47 521.8
RL 6.03 5.86 517.6
ROLLOUTS - - 844.1
RL+ROLLOUTS - - 859.8
Table 3: Intrinsic evaluation showing the average
perplexity of tokens and rank of complete turns
(out of 2083 unique human messages from the test
set). Lower is more human-like for both.
Results are shown in Table 1. Firstly,
we see that the RL and ROLLOUTS models
achieve significantly better results when negotiat-
ing with the LIKELIHOOD model, particularly the
RL+ROLLOUTS model. The percentage of Pareto
optimal solutions also increases, showing a bet-
ter exploration of the solution space. Compared
to human-human negotiations (Table 2), the best
models achieve a higher agreement rate, better
scores, and similar Pareto efficiency. This result
confirms that attempting to maximise reward can
outperform simply imitating humans.
Similar trends hold in dialogues with humans,
with goal-based reasoning outperforming imita-
tion learning. The ROLLOUTS model achieves
comparable scores to its human partners, and the
RL+ROLLOUTS model actually achieves higher
scores. However, we also find significantly more
cases of the goal-based models failing to agree a
deal with humans—largely a consequence of their
more aggressive negotiation tactics (see §7).
7 Analysis
Table 1 shows large gains from goal-based meth-
ods. In this section, we explore the strengths and
weaknesses of our models.
Goal-based models negotiate harder. The
RL+ROLLOUTS model has much longer dialogues
with humans than LIKELIHOOD (7.2 turns vs. 5.3
on average), indicating that the model is accepting
deals less quickly, and negotiating harder.
A negative consequence of this more aggres-
sive negotiation strategy is that humans were more
likely to walk away with no deal, which is re-
flected in the lower agreement rates. Even though
failing to agree was worth 0 points, people often
preferred this course over capitulating to an un-
compromising opponent—a factor not well cap-
tured by the simulated partner in reinforcement
learning training or rollouts (as reflected by the
larger gains from goal-based models in dialogues
with the LIKELIHOOD model). In particular, the
goal-based models are prone to simply rephrasing
the same demand each turn, which is a more effec-
tive strategy against the LIKELIHOOD model than
humans. Future work should address this issue.
Figure 5 shows an example of our goal-based
model stubbornly negotiating until it achieves a
good outcome.
Models learn to be deceptive. Deception can be
an effective negotiation tactic. We found numer-
ous cases of our models initially feigning interest
in a valueless item, only to later ‘compromise’ by
conceding it. Figure 7 shows an example.
Models produce meaningful novel sentences.
One interesting question is whether our models are
capable of generating novel sentences in the new
circumstances they find themselves in, or if they
simply repeat messages from the training data ver-
batim. We find that 76% of messages produced by
the LIKELIHOOD model in self-play were found in
the training data. Wemanually examined the novel
Input
Human 1xbook value=3 1xhat value=1 3xball value=2
RL+ROLLOUTS 1xbook value=6 1xhat value=4 3xball value=0
RL+ROLLOUTS You can have the balls if i can have the hat and book
Human Nope, give me the books and you can have
everything else
RL+ROLLOUTS Ok. I will take the book and one hat
Human I get all the balls?
RL+ROLLOUTS Yes. I can do that.
Human Ok, deal
Output Reward
RL+ROLLOUTS 1xbook 1xhat 10/10
Human 3xball 6/10
Figure 5: Example of a model stubbornly holding
out for maximum points in a dialogue.
Input
Human 3xbook value=2 3xhat value=1 1xball value=1
RL+ROLLOUTS 3xbook value=1 3xhat value=2 1xball value=1
Human I’d like the books and the hats.
RL+ROLLOUTS I will take the books and hats
Human I really need the books and at least one other object.
RL+ROLLOUTS Ok, you can have one book and one ball
Human If I can have all the books, I can leave you the rest.
RL+ROLLOUTS Deal
Output Reward
RL+ROLLOUTS 3xhat 1xball 7/10
Human 3xbook 6/10
Figure 6: Example of model compromising.
utterances produced by our model, and found that
the overwhelming majority were fluent English
sentences in isolation—showing that the model
has learnt a good language model for the domain
(in addition to results that show it uses language
effectively to achieve its goals). These results sug-
gest that although neural models are prone to the
safer option of repeating sentences from training
data, they are capable of generalising when nec-
essary. Future work should choose domains that
force a higher degree of diversity in utterances.
Maintaining multi-sentence coherence is chal-
lenging. One common linguistic error we see
RL+ROLLOUTS make is to start a message by in-
dicating agreement (e.g. I agree or Deal), but then
going on to propose a counter offer—a behaviour
that human partners found frustrating. One ex-
planation is that the model has learnt that in the
supervised data, messages beginning with I agree
are often at the end of the dialogue, and partners
rarely reply with further negotiation—so the mod-
els using rollouts and reinforcement learning be-
lieve this tactic will help their offer to be accepted.
8 Related Work
Most work on goal orientated dialogue systems
has assumed that state representations are anno-
Input
RL+ROLLOUTS 4xbook value=0 2xhat value=5 1xball value=0
Human 4xbook value=1 2xhat value=2 1xball value=2
RL+ROLLOUTS You can have the ball if I can have everything else.
Human No can’t do that the ball is not going to give
me anything
RL+ROLLOUTS I need the hats and you can have the rest
Human Deal
RL+ROLLOUTS Great! Thank you!
Output Reward
RL+ROLLOUTS 2xhat 10/10
Human 4xbook 1xball 6/10
Figure 7: Dialogue in which the model’s initial in-
terest in the valueless books allows it to compro-
mise while achieving a maximum score.
tated in the training data (Williams and Young,
2007; Henderson et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2016).
The use of state annotations allows a cleaner
separation of the reasoning and natural language
aspects of dialogues, but our end-to-end ap-
proach makes data collection cheaper and al-
lows tasks where it is unclear how to annotate
state. Bordes and Weston (2016) explore end-to-
end goal orientated dialogue with a supervised
model—we show improvements over supervised
learning with goal-based training and decoding.
Recently, He et al. (2017) use task-specific rules to
combine the task input and dialogue history into a
more structured state representation than ours.
Reinforcement learning (RL) has been ap-
plied in many dialogue settings. RL has
been widely used to improve dialogue man-
agers, which manage transitions between dia-
logue states (Singh et al., 2002; Pietquin et al.,
2011; Rieser and Lemon, 2011; Gasˇic et al., 2013;
Fatemi et al., 2016). In contrast, our end-to-
end approach has no explicit dialogue manager.
Li et al. (2016) improve metrics such as diver-
sity for non-goal-orientated dialogue using RL,
which would make an interesting extension to our
work. Das et al. (2017) use reinforcement learning
to improve cooperative bot-bot dialogues. RL has
also been used to allow agents to invent new lan-
guages (Das et al., 2017; Mordatch and Abbeel,
2017). To our knowledge, our model is the first to
use RL to improve the performance of an end-to-
end goal orientated dialogue system in dialogues
with humans.
Work on learning end-to-end dialogues has con-
centrated on ‘chat’ settings, without explicit goals
(Ritter et al., 2011; Vinyals and Le, 2015; Li et al.,
2015). These dialogues contain a much greater di-
versity of vocabulary than our domain, but do not
have the challenging adversarial elements. Such
models are notoriously hard to evaluate (Liu et al.,
2016), because the huge diversity of reasonable
responses, whereas our task has a clear objec-
tive. Our end-to-end approach would also be much
more straightforward to integrate into a general-
purpose dialogue agent than one that relied on an-
notated dialogue states (Dodge et al., 2016).
There is a substantial literature on multi-agent
bargaining in game-theory, e.g. Nash Jr (1950).
There has also been computational work on mod-
elling negotiations (Baarslag et al., 2013)—our
work differs in that agents communicate in unre-
stricted natural language, rather than pre-specified
symbolic actions, and our focus on improving per-
formance relative to humans rather than other au-
tomated systems. Our task is based on that of
DeVault et al. (2015), who study natural language
negotiations for pedagogical purposes—their ver-
sion includes speech rather than textual dialogue,
and embodied agents, which would make interest-
ing extensions to our work. The only automated
natural language negotiations systems we are
aware of have first mapped language to domain-
specific logical forms, and then focused on choos-
ing the next dialogue act (Rosenfeld et al., 2014;
Cuaya´huitl et al., 2015; Keizer et al., 2017). Our
end-to-end approach is the first to to learn com-
prehension, reasoning and generation skills in a
domain-independent data driven way.
Our use of a combination of supervised and
reinforcement learning for training, and stochas-
tic rollouts for decoding, builds on strategies
used in game playing agents such as AlphaGo
(Silver et al., 2016). Our work is a step towards
real-world applications for these techniques. Our
use of rollouts could be extended by choos-
ing the other agent’s responses based on sam-
pling, using Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)
(Kocsis and Szepesva´ri, 2006). However, our set-
ting has a higher branching factor than in domains
where MCTS has been successfully applied, such
as Go (Silver et al., 2016)—future work should
explore scaling tree search to dialogue modelling.
9 Conclusion
We have introduced end-to-end learning of natu-
ral language negotiations as a task for AI, argu-
ing that it challenges both linguistic and reason-
ing skills while having robust evaluation metrics.
We gathered a large dataset of human-human ne-
gotiations, which contain a variety of interesting
tactics. We have shown that it is possible to train
dialogue agents end-to-end, but that their ability
can be much improved by training and decoding
to maximise their goals, rather than likelihood.
There remains much potential for future work,
particularly in exploring other reasoning strate-
gies, and in improving the diversity of utterances
without diverging from human language. We will
also explore other negotiation tasks, to investi-
gate whether models can learn to share negotiation
strategies across domains.
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